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Introduction: Choice and Authority in Either/Or
In Kierkegaard circles, there is currently a lively discussion of Kierkegaard’s 
concept of ethical authority, prompted in part by Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
argument in After Virtue that »the transition from an aesthetic to an ethi­
cal view of existence« can only be made by an arbitrary or »criterionless 
choice,« as Marilyn Piety puts it.2 Like Piety, Anthony Rudd,3 George 
Stack,4 Alastair Hannay,5 Timothy Jackson,6 and others, I have argued in 
an earlier article that MacIntyre is wrong to construe the ‘primordial 
choice’ to be an agent who chooses in ethical consciousness as an act of 
arbitrary freedom.7 Drawing on Harry Frankfurt’s analysis of higher-order 
volitions through which persons ‘identify’ with some desires or motives 
for acting while alienating others,8 I argued that the ‘primordial choice’ 
Judge William describes in Either/Or II can be interpreted as the choice 
to engage in such identification or to form an ‘inner character’ consist­
ing patterns of higher-order volitions.9 Therefore the primordial choice 
to become a chooser-in-the-ethical-sense does not generate the authority 
of ethical principles for the individual, as MacIntyre assumes, but rather 
gives the distinctions of good and evil character a personal relevance 
within the individual’s life. But the objective authority of the agent’s 
conscience — or her cognitive access to ethical values and standards of 
moral worth — does not derive from her original choice to be a ‘chooser.’ 
Rather, the aesthete at some point in life cognitively awakens usually 
through some crisis, or through being challenged by other persons10 — to 
a primordial responsibility to decide what kind of person to be, or to 
commit inwardly to acting on motives that reflect what he most cares
about, rather than merely drifting along and letting his intentions be de­
termined by the relative strength of opposing appetites and inclinations 
as they vary over time, without unity or order. At this point, the awak­
ened aesthete must in one way or another make a primordial choice be­
tween the aesthetic and the ethical modes of existence, but it is hardly an 
arbitrary one. Contra MacIntyre, awareness of the force of moral norms, 
including the ability to make them one’s own as guides for action, is 
possible for ‘awakened’ aesthetes. Moreover, since past this point one can­
not consciously return to unawakened immediacy, if he chooses the aes­
thetic, he enters into sin instead.11
My goal in this paper is to look at how Kierkegaard’s Concept of Anx­
iety sheds light on this question about ethical authority and choice in Ei­
ther/Or II. I argue that the Concept of Anxiety portrays the story of the 
Fall in Genesis as a paradigm of the aesthetic-ethical transition. Thus the 
analysis of anxiety’s role in original sin helps explain why the freedom of 
choice involved in this transition is not an empty, arbitrary, or voluntarist 
indeterminism.12
The Universalization o f ‘First Sin’ 
in The Concept of Anxiety, Chapter I.
In The Concept of Anxiety ,13 Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Vigilius Haufnien- 
sis (‘VH’ for short) articulates a radically new position on original sin, 
which rejects both traditional Catholic and Protestant interpretations in 
favor of one that, at least in my view, makes more sense ethically.14 This 
innovation is not simply a result of the pseudonym’s psychological ap­
proach to sin by way of its ambiguous antecedents,15 but is motivated by 
Kierkegaard’s own ethical concern that the traditional interpretations of 
original sin encourage the attitude that we are not really ‘at fault’ for our 
moral imperfection, since as a general condition sinfulness is Adam’s fault. 
To avoid this error, VH first distinguishes between ‘sinfulness’ as a dispo­
sitional state constituted by the volitional possibility of sin,16 and the ‘first 
sin’ in which an individual actualizes this salient possibility: »The new 
quality appears with the first [sin], with the leap, with the suddenness of 
the enigmatic« {CA 30; SV t 4, 303).17 Corresponding to this distinction 
is a division of labor between ‘dogmatic’ or religious ethics, which pre­
supposes the possibility of sin and deals with its actual »manifestation,
but not with its coming into existence« (CA 21; SVI 4, 294), and 
psychology, which can illuminate the subjective experiences of sinfulness 
but cannot explain the final emergence of actual sin, since that is ‘not a 
state’ or disposition but rather an act (CA 15; SV i 4, 287):18
The subject of which psychology treats must be something (...) that re­
mains in a restless repose (...) But this abiding something out of which 
sin constantly arises, not by necessity (for becoming by necessity is a 
state (...)) but by freedom -  this abiding something, this predisposing 
something, sin’s real possibility, is a subject of interest for psychology 
(CA 21; SV i 4, 294 -  my italics).
Employing this distinction, VH then argues against the doctrine that the 
original sinfulness which precedes ‘first sin’ in us is itself the result of 
Adam’s first sin. On the contrary, he maintains that »Just as Adam lost in­
nocence by guilt, so every man loses it in the same way« (CA 35; SV i 4, 
307), i.e. in his own rather than Adam’s first sin:
It is not in the interest of ethics to make all men except Adam into 
concerned and interested spectators of guiltiness but not participants in 
guiltiness, nor is it in the interest of dogmatics to make all men inter­
ested and sympathetic spectators of the Atonement but not participants 
in the Atonement (CA 36; SV i 4, 308).
In accordance with this statement, VH presents two distinguishable ar­
guments against a hereditary source of sinfulness: an ethical argument, 
and an existential argument about the historicity of persons, which is 
crucial for Christian religiousness. The first argument is based on the in­
justice of making Adam superlatively sinful, i.e. making him an agent 
who, starting from an imaginary perfect innocence, sins directly against 
God and thereby causes us not to begin with the same qualitative advan­
tage that he had:
Through the first sin, sin came into the world. Precisely in the same 
way it is true of every subsequent man’s first sin, that through it sin 
comes into the world. That it was not in the world before Adam’s first 
sin is, in relation to sin itself, something entirely accidental and irrele­
vant. It is of no significance and cannot justify making Adam’s sin 
greater or the first sin of every other man lesser (CA 31; SV i 4, 303).
As I read it, this argument implicitly appeals to the main tenets of the 
agapeistic ethics which Kierkegaard later articulates in Works of Love. For 
it is contrary to his religious ethics to make an exception which excludes 
anyone, including Adam, from the universal sphere of humanity, in 
which every neighbor is equal in worth before God.19 The interpretation 
that takes Adam as the cause of all future sinfulness makes him essentially 
unequal to us, an agent of transcendent turpitude. Thus this traditional 
interpretation is false. This argument has an edifying function, since it de­
nies that the ‘quantitative’ accumulation of sinfulness in the history of 
human culture determines the qualitative leap in which each new person 
freely sins for the first time: »If every subsequent man’s first sin were thus 
brought about by [historical/inherited] sinfulness, his first sin would 
only in a nonessential way be qualified as first« (CA 31; SV1 4, 303). By 
contrast, VH’s conception puts the responsibility squarely back on each 
individual, making all of us Adam’s equal: »innocence is always lost only 
by the qualitative leap of the individual« (CA 37; SV1 4, 309). As Gor­
don Marino says, Kierkegaard here rejects the idea that we are ‘innately 
corrupt,’ since this makes individual responsibility impossible.20
Yet VH is at pains to insist that this view does not amount to the 
isolationist individuality of Pelegianism, which abstracts individual free­
dom from history (CA 34; SV1 4, 306). So his second argument focuses 
on the idea that if »the particular individual participates in inherited sin 
only through his relation to Adam and not through his primitive relation 
to sin,« then Adam would be »placed fantastically outside history« (CA 
26; SV1 4, 298). Against this, VH argues that individuality and historical 
connection to others are united in human personhood.21 The idea here 
is difficult, but importantly linked to the idea of a ‘repetition’ that is not 
a simple reinstantiation of the same. Because each individual adds to the 
history of the race »by the qualitative leap,« every person »begins anew 
with the race«22 and is more than an »empty repetition« (CA 33f.; SV1 
4, 305f.). But because each person is also ‘descended’ or temporally re­
lated to others, their freedom which introduces novelty is not ahistori- 
cally isolated, but is affected by the past and affects the future possibilities 
of the race (CA 34; SV i 4, 306). Out of this individual historicity arises 
the history of the race,23 which transcends the individual and does not 
begin anew with each person.24 As VH says later in chapter two,
Christianity has never assented to giving each particular individual the
privilege of starting from the beginning in an external sense. Each indi-
vidual begins in a historical nexus, and the consequences of nature still 
hold true (CA 73; SV i 4, 342 -  my italics).
This ‘external’ difference between our situation and Adam’s includes the 
effects of past sin, such as that ‘sensuousness’ acquired the connotation of 
sinfulness (CA 73; SV i 4, 342). Thus freedom and temporal connection 
go together and the person’s individuality consists partly in her historical 
uniqueness: »no individual begins at the same place as another, but every 
individual begins anew« (CA 34-35; SV i 4, 306). Moreover, this exis­
tential argument from historicity dovetails with the ethical argument. 
Since each person’s individuality derives in part from the uniqueness of 
her historical relations, and the ‘quantitative’ historical progression af­
fects (yet without determining) her freedom:25
Every individual is essentially interested in the history of all other indi­
viduals, and just as essentially in his own. Perfection in oneself is there­
fore the perfect participation in the whole. No individual is indifferent 
to the history of the race any more than the race is indifferent to the 
history of the individual (CA 29; SV i 4, 301).
This passage, which anticipates several themes in Kierkegaard’s Works of 
Love,26 suggests that the historicity of human individuality is the existen­
tial ground of Kierkegaard’s agape ethics.27 On the basis of this historici­
ty, VH mounts an argument by dilemma. (1) If Adam is not an historical 
individual, whose life is able to affect the history of the race like any 
other, then »the race has its beginning with an individual who is not an 
individual« (CM 33; SV i 4, 305). This is a contradiction, because the 
race cannot be historical if Adam is not. (2) But if Adam does have a his­
torical role, then it cannot be merely to determine future sinfulness in the 
race, because then Adam would be historical but the race would not: it 
would not consist of temporally related agents who begin qualitatively 
anew in their individual freedom, but would instead be a substance ex­
tended in time, or natural kind (like an animal species)28 rather than a 
‘race,’ which is essentially historical.29 So the historicity of human exist­
ence entails that the first human being could only be another historical 
individual equal to all others, affecting the race by his or her history but 
not determining its subsequent individual members or fixing their ‘na­
ture’ as particular instances of a species.
Since this falsifies the orthodox doctrine that Adam’s sin differs from
ours because »Adam’s sin conditions sinfulness as a consequence« (CA 
30; SV i 4, 302), and since VH says that we participate in ‘inherited sin’ 
through our ‘primitive relation’ to sin rather than through a hereditary 
relation to Adam (CA 26; SV i 4, 298), we might conclude that in each 
person, first sin is possible because of her own prior ‘sinfulness’ or primi­
tive volitional disposition to sin. Then VH’s new conception would dif­
fer from the traditional picture only in denying that the preceding dispo­
sition in each is caused by Adam. On this reading, VH would hold that 
the dispositional possibility of sin in each of us is not the result of our 
own acts (let alone of the result of some first man’s act), but is ‘already 
there’ in the very constitution o f ‘human nature’ (CA 22; SV i 4, 294), 
in the temporality and finitude that makes us mortal.30 This would be 
similar to Schelling’s mythic scheme in which the possibility of evil arises 
from the fact that his relation to the chthonic ‘Ground’ of Being is differ­
ent from God’s relation to it. Louis Dupre describes this view as follows:
Man as the only creature to rise from this dark Ground to the full clari­
ty of a spiritual existence displays a unique resemblance with God (...).
Still while attaining individual form in the clarity of spirit man also re­
mains attached to the indeterminate Ground from which he emerges.
In God nature and spirit are indissolubly united. In man, their bond re­
mains fragile, ever to be renewed.31
This conception undoubtably had a very strong influence on Heidegger, 
but as Dupre argues, Kierkegaard rejects Schelling’s scheme and the »ro­
mantic concept of freedom« which reduces it to a »mere feeling of ‘infi­
nite possibility’« unconnected to necessity.32 VH thus denies that ‘evil 
desire’ or ‘concupiscence’ is innate (CA 73; SV i 4, 342), and departs 
even more radically from traditional doctrine by insisting that the state of 
sinfulness itself properly originates in each of us with our own first act of 
sin (though paradoxically, this is still predisposed). Since sin presupposes 
sinfulness, but this state itself is freely adopted, »sin presupposes itself« 
and to be accurate, we must not say that by »Adam’s first sin, sin came 
into the world,« but rather that »by first sin, sinfulness came into Adam,« 
just as happens with each of us (CA 32-33; SV i 4, 305 -  my italics). 
Every individual »by his own first sin, brings sinfulness into the world« 
and the disposition of sinfulness in any given person cannot »begin in 
any other way than with sin« (CA 34; SV i 4, 306). As John Tanner puts 
it in his comparison of The Concept of Anxiety and Milton’s Paradise Lost,
for Kierkegaard, Adam and Eve’s »identity with the human family« does 
not rest on their sharing the same innate sinfulness, or »being fallen from 
the start, but from their distinctly human capacity to fall freely.«33 Their 
story is the paradigm for the narrative of every individual’s development.
Some scholars have referred to the tension here as grounds for 
doubting that this revisionary account of original sin is Kierkegaard’s 
own. In an important paper, Vanessa Rumble has argued that Haufnien- 
sis »periodically dismisses the possibility of a ‘sin’ that is incurred with­
out the individual’s assent«34 but that this more ‘Kantian’ treatment of 
original sin is undercut later in the text. For example, at one point 
»Haufniensis qualifies his initial declaration of the individual’s responsi­
bility for the fall into sin« by claiming that the past quantitative accumu­
lation can produce an anxiety about the possibility which itself constitutes 
sin.35 Rumble argues that these and other tensions in Haufniensis’s ac­
count are meant to indicate something he himself does not see, namely 
that his own position as a ‘watchman,’ a supposedly neutral observer, is a 
(non-innocent) attempt to remain in the aesthetic, and hence itself fraught 
with mature anxiety (pp. 612-13). Like the ambiguous oracle on whom 
pagans rely,
Haufniensis’s [account] oscillates between (1) claiming an absolute free­
dom which we assume in ‘the qualitative leap’ and (2) attributing the 
individuals ‘fall’ to an anxiety magnified to unbearable proportions.36
Though I cannot answer all of Rumble’s arguments here, it is not clear 
that the text really ever promotes this second alternative as she construes 
it. In particular, Haufniensus writes:
(...) the spirits anxiety in assuming responsibility for sensuousness be­
comes a greater anxiety. At the maximum we find here the dreadful fact 
that anxiety about sin produces sin. If evil desire, concupiscence, etc. are 
regarded as innate in the individual, there is not the ambiguity in which 
the individual becomes both guilty and innocent (CA 30; SV t 4, 342).
This is meant to defend the paradox that sinfulness starts in our act and is 
yet predisposed without being innate; without this paradox, the innatist 
theory misconstrues the ambiguous status of ‘innocent’ or unawakened 
aestheticism. In our time, an innocent individual »has an historical envi­
ronment in which it may become apparent that sensuousness can signify
sinfulness« (CA 30; SVi 4, 343), and thus, without really understanding 
it, he can develop an oversensitive fear that any immodesty will be a sign 
to others of something called ‘sin’. Thus the maximum effect of the quan­
titative accumulation of sin in our history
corresponds to the aforementioned -  that the individual in anxiety 
about sin brings forth sin -  namely, the individual, in anxiety not about be­
coming guilty, but about being regarded as guilty, becomes guilty (CA 74-75;
SVi 4, 344).
VH’s point is thus that (a) historical familiarity with the relation of sen­
suousness to sin can give the innocent agent an anxiety about being 
judged as sinful by others, or seeing himself as already steeped in sin,37 
and (b) this anxiety itself may awaken him to the possibility of deserving 
the judgment and thus precipitate sin.38 There is a terrible irony in this, 
as when a warning first makes salient to us to the very possibility of 
transgressing (CA 74; SV i 4, 343); but this still does not mean that sin is 
‘produced’ causally, i.e. without the leap.39 The first form of anxiety that 
predisposes sin — even as intensified in later individuals because of the ef­
fects of sin in human history — does not itself constitute sin, nor does it 
necessitate sin.40 As Marino says, »under no circumstances can this presen­
timent, which is anxiety, determine sin.«41 Thus one can be faithful to 
the text without accepting Rumble’s analysis.42
III. The Aesthetic —
Ethical Transition and Nonarbitrary Freedom
The apparent conflict between innate and self-caused accounts of sinful­
ness is to be resolved, I believe, by realizing that sinfulness is necessarily 
ambiguous for VH: it both precedes (and is presupposed by) a given sin­
ful act, and yet it is shaped as a volitional ‘disposition’ by such acts. This 
is why the anxiety in which we experience sinfulness is similarly ambigu­
ous, both preceding sin and following as a consequence from sin.43 In the 
first sin, the two sides of this ambiguity seem to come together: as a 
journal entry suggests, Adam’s »first sin is sinfulness« itself, the very dis­
position that »gave birth to actual sins in him« (CA 184; Pap. V B 52:4).44 
Behind this paradox stands the same conception of freedom that was op­
erative in Either/Or II: freedom is dispositional and dialectical, tran­
scending substantive determination by its openness to alternatives, yet 
shaping by its own acts the way these options appear to the agent and 
their relative availability to her will.
This conception of freedom becomes clearer in light of Haufniensis’s 
explanation o f ‘pre-threshold’45 or ‘objective’ anxiety in the story of the 
Fall. Since Adam’s fall is qualitatively the same as each later individual’s 
fall, it is the model for the transition from the aesthetic to ethical mode 
of existence which occupied the Judge in Either/Or II. The problem in 
this transition is how to understand the ‘choice’ by which the ethical 
distinction between good and evil ‘comes alive’ for us, or by which we 
activate our ‘spirit’ (the self that forms and consists of continuing higher- 
order volitions or volitional character). Judge William phrases this in 
enigmatic terms as a choice by which good and evil are first posited for 
us precisely to follow the biblical paradox of a responsible choice 
through which Adam first ‘comes to know’ good and evil. While Ei­
ther/Or focuses on the significance of this choice in abstract, the task in 
the Concept of Anxiety is to make sense of such a choice in the concrete 
form of original sin, and to explain why it is not arbitrary and how the 
agent can be responsible for it.
This comparison between Adam and the awakening aesthete is 
bound to seem controversial, since it suggests that existence in Eden is 
somehow imperfect or immature: compared to this, the Fall (despite its 
sinfulness) is an existential advance. Yet I think this was precisely Kierke­
gaard’s way of making sense of the Genesis narrative. It is not only con­
sonant with, but even required by his text: as John Tanner says with 
Kierkegaard and Milton in mind, »Qualified by spirit, Edenic existence 
seems designed specifically to be broken apart (,..).«46 In short, the Fall is 
a felix culpa.
VH emphasizes that ‘innocence is ignorance’ (CA 37; SVI 4, 309), 
specifically in the biblical sense that »man in his innocence« before the 
Fall has no »knowledge of the difference between good and evil« (CA 
41; SV i 4, 313). In this respect, the innocent person is like the unawak­
ened aesthete who, as I analyzed him, tacitly refrains from explicitly fac­
ing the choice between the aesthetic and ethical,47 and therefore remains 
oblivious to the primordial responsibility to form higher-order volitions 
informed by ethical distinctions and principles. Like the aesthete, the in­
nocent is not transparent to herself, since her spirit is ‘dreaming’ (CA 
41; SV i 4, 313), and she experiences the possibility of her freedom as
open ‘possibility of possibility;’ the spiritual possibility of higher-order 
will is accessible only as an empty anxiety (CA 42; SV i 4, 313). Yet the 
aesthete is not merely wanton like an animal, since in Frankfurt’s terms 
she already has an implicit highest-order will, namely a subconscious will 
to avoid concrete higher-order volitions). Likewise, Kierkegaard’s inno­
cent person is not simply spiritless; rather, her spirit is still in a kind of 
chrysalis stage:
Man is a synthesis of the psychical and the physical; however, a synthe­
sis is unthinkable if the two are not united in a third. This third is spir­
it.48 In innocence, man is not merely animal, for if he were at any mo­
ment of his life merely animal, he would never become man. So spirit 
is present, but as immediate, as dreaming (CA 43; SV i 4, 315).
In other words, the capacity for higher-order will must be there from the 
beginning, in the potentia of a tacit highest-order volition, which in aes­
thetic immediacy is not yet revealed to us — a volition that is ours, but 
that is not actively chosen or earnestly posited. Thus before »the spirit 
becomes actual« and there is explicit choice in the will, the person is, as 
VH says, »not animal, but neither is he really man« (CA 49; SV i 4, 
319). Hence the concomitant anxiety in innocence, which is »the pro­
found secret of innocence« (CA 41; SV i 4, 313), is thus not yet a sign of 
moral ‘guilt’ (CA 42; SV i 4, 314), but can be understood as the experi­
ence of a special kind of ambiguity in the agent’s highest-order will. This 
ambiguity is not a conflict of authentically undertaken cares or commit­
ments; it is rather a sense of the will as an unsaturated potential, open to an 
indefinite range of unspecified possibilities. The anxiety of innocence 
lacks a clear object precisely because it is the experience of a freedom or 
modal openness that is unsaturated in just this sense: Adam’s anxiety is »a 
nothing — the anxious possibility of being able. He has no conception of 
what he is able to do« (CA 44; SV i 4, 315) which is precisely why it 
does not appear to him as »an ability to choose the good or the evil« 
(CA 49; SV i 4, 320).49
The ability actively to determine one’s highest-order volition or 
ownmost commitment must become explicit to the agent before its sig­
nificance can be personally experienced in terms of the ethical distinc­
tion. Thus, as I read it, for Kierkegaard the sense in which Adam has no 
‘knowledge’ of good or evil (CA 44; SV i 4, 315) is not so much a cogni­
tive deficiency in understanding objective authority but more a volitional
lack of the appropriation needed to connect the authority of ethical cate­
gories to his freedom, giving it subjective meaning or personal relevance 
for him. Likewise, the aesthete has a speculative outline-knowledge of 
good and evil, but he does not in the biblical sense (of intimate familiar­
ity) know these categories. This is evidently the sense VH has in mind 
when he writes, »This applies above all to the difference between good 
and evil, which indeed can be expressed in language but nevertheless is 
only for freedom (...)« (CA 45-46; SV i 4, 316). Only through free ap­
propriation can the ethical distinction which is already cognitively antic­
ipated be fully comprehended. Thus VH says that human innocence, 
unlike animal ignorance of morals, is already »qualified in the direction 
of knowledge« (CA 68; SV i 4, 338). Our telos involves making the sub­
stantive contrast between good and evil our own in the most intimate 
way, as the foundation of our own self-constituting choices.
In Either/Or II, something external must help bring the aesthete to 
the point of facing the choice between the aesthetic and ethical in his 
highest-order will. Likewise, in the Concept of Anxiety, VH follows Us- 
teri’s interpretation that the prohibition on eating the fruit itself brings 
Adam to the point where sin is possible, or »predisposes that which breaks 
forth in Adams qualitative leap« (CA 39; SV i 4, 311). But since it is im­
possible to explain psychologically why a prohibition should awaken 
‘concupiscentia,’ or sinfulness as inordinate desire for the forbidden (CA 
40; SV i 4, 312), VH says instead that, »the prohibition induces in him 
anxiety, for the prohibition awakens in him freedoms possibility« (CA 
44; SV i 4, 315). The prohibition’s function relative to freedom here is 
like the function of the Anstoß — the ‘check’ of alterity — in consolidat­
ing self-consciousness in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre.50 As VH notes, Franz 
Baader says that the prohibition is a ‘temptation,’ not in the sense of a 
temptation to evil, but rather in the sense of a stimulus that elicits and 
consolidates freedom, or serves as »freedom’s ‘necessary other’« (CA 39f.; 
SVi 4, 311).51 In Either-Or and the Postscript, the aesthete encounters such 
an ‘other’ or Anstoß in suffering or misfortune,52 which is an obstacle to 
continued aestheticism, an intrusion that quickens her awareness of the 
possibility of choosing between aesthetic and ethical determinations of 
the highest-order will. Likewise in the Fall, for the innocent person the 
prohibition and threat of punishment are Anstoße that awaken »The infi­
nite possibility of being able« and bring innocence »to its uttermost« 
(CA 45; SV i 4, 316), to the limit of the naive-aesthetical, where through 
a leap it will become spiritual, either in sinfulness or its opposite.
In other words, the anxiety Kierkegaard is concerned with is specifi­
cally volitional anxiety: in this state, the will or spirit manifests its own an­
ticipatory and pre-reflective sense that it will be faced with what Wil­
liam James would have called a forced choice. But anxiety in this sense is 
not necessarily the defense mechanism of an unwilling chooser. Even an 
individual who does not shrink back, but opens herself to the new hori­
zons of possibility emerging before her must undergo anxiety as an un­
avoidable growing pain of the spirit. To progress towards full selfhood, 
the individual must cultivate her agency by identifying with her anxiety, 
finding in it a kind of intellectual intuition of her individuality as a being 
of volitional freedom in temporal form.
One cannot understand Either/Or II or The Concept of Anxiety, then, 
without grasping the close relation between the categories of aestheti­
cism and innocence. It is in principle possible to move from aesthetic to 
ethical existence without sin, but in fact the ethical categories always 
first come alive to us through guilty choices mediated by anxiety. No 
human being develops directly from innocence into a self, defined by its 
proper relation to the infinite source of value; it is always in sin that hu­
man beings discover that our life cannot have the sort of meaning we re­
quire without reference to an eternal goal. As Alastair Hannay puts it, 
for Kierkegaard the »threshold insight« into the nature of good and evil 
that comes from discovering »the inability of temporal categories to pro­
vide criteria of personal identity and humanly fulfilling achievement« al­
ways takes the »natural initial form« of sinfulness.53 This insight corre­
sponds in my former analysis of Either/Or to the agents awakening to 
the primordial responsibility to choose the ethical as a responsibility he 
has already shirked. And Hannay also regards the action of »choosing the 
ethical« as the positive response to the »initially natural negative develop­
ment« of sin, the response which (if sustained) leads to overcoming de­





1. Despair (as denial or repres­
sion of the ethical potential of 
spirit)
2. Earnest choice of the ethical
The notion of volitional identification is also implicit in this account of 
anxiety. On the one hand, the anxiety which forces the will towards ex­
plicit choice and a full or ‘subjective’ knowledge of good and evil is an 
Anstoß, external to the will, yet the person becomes ‘guilty’ (capable of 
ethical qualification) through partially or ambiguously identifying with 
his potential for freedom:
(...) he who becomes guilty through anxiety is indeed innocent, for it 
was not he himself but anxiety, a foreign power, that laid hold of him, a 
power that he did not love but about which he was anxious. And yet 
he is guilty, for he sank in anxiety, which he nevertheless loved even as 
he feared it (CA 43; SV1 4, 314).
In other words, Adam’s predisposition comes from identifying with his 
anxiety, or with the potential freedom it signifies; it is his own spirit, in 
its dreaming state, that is the ‘hostile power’ (CA 43; SV1 4, 315). Thus 
VH makes the Jamesian argument that »each person is tempted by him­
self« (CA 48; SV1 4, 319) -  which also alludes to Fichte’s idea that there 
is a sense in which each person’s freedom is its own Anstoß. Similarly, as 
we saw, in his highest or innermost will the aesthete tacitly works at re­
maining naive or ‘innocent’ of the ethical, and resists letting the choice 
of highest-order volition become an explicit problem for him. The aes­
thete tacitly identifies with the anxious ambiguity of his innocence, but 
his consequent anxiety about this very identification inevitably brings the 
problem to a head (though without determining it). So when he finally 
faces his freedom to choose his highest-order will, he is eo ipso already 
‘guilty’ for having postponed it — and thus he experiences subjectively 
the responsibility to ‘choose the ethical’ mode of existence, i.e. to take 
active responsibility for his character or spiritual self by forming commit­
ments of the higher-order will grounded in objective duties and values.
Just as in Either/Or, however, this highest freedom, which leaps ei­
ther into sin or earnestness, is not »an abstract liberum arbitrium« (CA 49; 
SV1 4, 320). By ‘abstract,’ VH means indifference or a perfect equilibrium 
between alternatives, which is conceivable only in an imaginary disinter­
estedness. As Thomte notes, Kierkegaard follows Leibniz in this respect, 
rejecting any »ability of the will to choose independently of antecedent fac­
tors« (CA, 236, note 58). Instead, as Tanner nicely expresses it, »Kierke­
gaard’s treatise tries to chart an elusive via media between rigid necessity 
on the on hand and random spontaneity on the other.«55
This intermediate notion of liberty works roughly as represented in 
the following spatial model: think of the possibilities of action physically
open to an agent at any time as forming an asymmetrical field anchored 
to her character in the center: those options closer to her are more easily 
choosable, and those farther away are more difficult to choose, given her 
acquired character. But every choice alters (or deepens) the center of 
gravity in the character at the hub, and thus shifts the whole field. Free­
dom for Kierkegaard is always factically conditioned by the already-ac­
quired character of the choosing spirit, and so it is never neutral between 
its possibilities, since these are synthetic (i.e. volitional) ‘possibilities’ rather 
than merely logical possibilities for the spirit. At the same time, what 
makes the spirit free is not its having this or that concrete option but its 
unsaturated ability, its ‘infinity’ by which it transcends the factical and it 
not determined by the antecedents which nevertheless affect or condition 
it: thus »sin cannot be explained by anything antecedent to it, any more 
than can freedom« (CA 112; SV i 4, 380). Between this free transcen­
dence and the actual choice it finally posits lies anxiety, which is precise­
ly our experience of the confluence of factically conditioning dispositions 
and the openness of unsaturated possibility:
In a logical system, it is convenient to say that possibility passes over 
into actuality. However, in actuality it is not so convenient, and an in­
termediate term is required. The intermediate term is anxiety (...) Anx­
iety is neither a category of necessity nor a category of freedom [i.e. in­
finite ability]; it is entangled freedom, where freedom is not free in it­
self but entangled, not by necessity, but in itself (CA 49; SV i 4, 320).
This enigmatic image of freedom ‘entangled in itself’ is the core of Kier­
kegaard’s existential psychology. In one sense, as Marino has emphasized, 
‘entangled freedom’ is a prejorative: it refers to freedom in a »less than 
perfect form,«56 enmeshed in weakness, irresolve, dizzy uncertainty, and 
self-doubt. But our freedom is also self-entangled in another constitutive 
sense (which alone makes avoidable enmeshment in the pejorative sense 
possible): it expresses the idea that the ‘spirit’ on which selfhood depends 
is a freedom always conditioned by its own qualitative modality or form 
o f ‘possibility’. Free will’s inward limits do not derive from external con­
straints or causal necessities, but from ‘dispositions’ of the higher-order 
will itself that shape our volitional possibilities and qualify their relative 
availabilities for choice. This freedom is »entangled in itself« because the 
very dispositions of identification which shape and direct its volitional 
possibilities are the result of its own transcending leaps: that which con­
ditions freedom also presupposes it. Yet -  and this is the key -  no matter 
how far we regress, even to the most inward choice between the aesthet­
ic and the ethical, neither is the will ever motivated or explained by a 
character that is just predetermined or given as an ‘individual essence,’ 
nor does it ever begin shaping its inward character in total arbitrariness 
without any vestige of ‘self’ already there to condition it. In other words, 
spirit or free will is self-entangled in this constitutive sense all the way 
down. At the bottom, as Beabout puts it, a child’s freedom is conditioned 
by the social environment in which she is raised, and this is precisely 
how hereditary sin operates. But »the environment never wholly deter­
mines the individual,« and different responses to the environment remain 
possible.57 But either way she goes, the agent’s responses are themselves 
conditioned by anxiety of historically situated finite freedom, and thus 
never begin in a motivational vacuum.
As a result, the person’s ultimate character is neither simply uncho­
sen or teleologically determined, as in MacIntyre’s ‘narrative essential- 
ism,’58 nor is it the ‘original project’ of Sartre’s absolute freedom, which 
remains in anguish because of its uncontrollable future mutability. Our 
lasting volitional identifications do affect what is possible for us, and thus 
allow us to exercise a substantial level of control over our future actions 
and commitment, making for narrative unity. But this spiritual character 
begins in and retains a freedom that is always capable of changing our 
highest identifications, despite the difficulty of the choices this involves.
Something like this idea of dispositions of the higher-order will that 
form inner conditions on volitional possibility is apparent in VH’s discus­
sion of inwardness and disposition later in the Concept of Anxiety 
(pp. 146-150; SV i 4, 412-416). This section makes clear that earnestness 
is a kind of free ‘disposition’ of the higher-order will: VH says that earnest­
ness is »a higher as well as a deeper expression for what disposition is« 
(CA 148; SV i 4, 414). While disposition »is a determinant of immedia­
cy,« and the repetition it involves is thus ‘habit’ (or disposition of first- 
order will), earnestness is a different kind of disposition in which repeti­
tion involves »originality preserved in the responsibility of freedom.« As 
a result, »earnestness can never become a habit« (CA 149; SV i 4, 414). 
Earnestness in this sense is like care in Frankfurt’s moral psychology, since 
cares are higher-order volitions sustained over time that commit the per­
son authentically to projects, people, and ends he regards as important.59
IV. Conclusion
It is clear that the notion of intermediate liberty developed in the Con­
cept of Anxiety confirms my explanation of why the ‘choice’ between the 
aesthetic and ethical in Either/Or II is not an arbitrary or irrational 
choice. The complex dialectic of free choice and ethical authority in the 
Judge’s ‘Equilibrium’ letter carefully anticipates Haufniensis’s description 
of innocence, good and evil, and anxiety and freedom in the narrative of 
the Fall. The Judge describes authenticity as choice with »real earnest­
ness,« (EO  162; S V f  2,144 and writes that
The personality is already interested in the choice before one chooses, 
and when the choice is postponed, the personality chooses uncon­
sciously, or the choice is made by obscure powers within it (...) (EO,
168; SV i, 2,149).
The problem of the Fall and original sin should therefore be seen as un­
derlying the account in Either/Or 17, and the distinction between the 
aesthetic and ethical should be understood in that light. Every human 
being repeats the original sin, but in the same process they also repeat the 
original discovery of freedom that leads to selfhood. In freedom, we dis­
cover the possibility of a self-relation that depends in turn on the Eter­
nal, first as ethical ideality and then as a personal Absolute. Our human 
relationship to God thus has the possibility of sin (and the potential to 
become aware of this possibility) written into it from the start, and we 
could not be what we are without this. This is not simply a Schellingian 
heresy, however. It is also arguably St. Augustine’s conclusion in Part III 
of On Free Choice of the Will. To place Kierkegaard in this tradition re­
quires more argument than I have given here, but I hope to have laid a 
basis for such an argument.
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